Transportation Network Companies, Proposition 22, and the Future of Labor Relations in the United States by Midgley, Nate
Hatfield Graduate Journal of Public Affairs 
Volume 5 




Transportation Network Companies, Proposition 22, 
and the Future of Labor Relations in the United 
States 
Nate Midgley 
Portland State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/hgjpa 
 Part of the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Midgley, Nate (2021) "Transportation Network Companies, Proposition 22, and the Future of Labor 
Relations in the United States," Hatfield Graduate Journal of Public Affairs: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article 6. 
https://doi.org/10.15760/hgjpa.2021.5.1.6 
This open access Article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
ShareAlike 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0). All documents in PDXScholar should meet accessibility 
standards. If we can make this document more accessible to you, contact our team. 






Transportation Network Companies, 
Proposition 22, and the Future of Labor 
Relations in the United States 
 
 
While the victory of Proposition 22 (Prop 22) in the November 3rd, 2020 California 
State election came as a shock to many observers, Transportation Network 
Companies (TNCs) such as Uber and Lyft, the architects and beneficiaries of the 
ballot measure, have a long track record of subverting regulatory attempts. From 
this historical perspective, the novelty of Prop 22 is not related to the means 
employed in its victory, but in the sheer scale of effort involved. In other words, 
Prop 22 represents an escalation of a familiar framework of regulatory subversion 
by the TNCs, whose success at the ballot box may turn the initiative campaign into 
something of a model for their contemporaries looking to skirt burdensome 
regulation or trim labor costs and benefits. 
From this vantage, it is rather easy to draw any number of worthwhile lines of 
inquiry from Prop 22’s victory, but this paper will concern itself primarily with the 
implications of these proceedings on the future of labor relations in this country. It 
will strive to address these implications by beginning with an introductory section 
that will familiarize the reader with a framework for understanding the TNCs 
history of regulatory subversion. Then it will present a brief outline of the relevant 
case and legislative history that led the TNCs to pursue Prop 22 in California. From 
there, it will take a step back and discuss what Prop 22 does and, by extension, why 
it is so crucial for the TNC business model. It will then turn its attention to the pro-
Prop 22 campaign and how it used in-app “clicktivism”, political contributions, 
misinformation, and superficial racial politics to mobilize the California electorate. 
Finally, the paper will close with a section dedicated to parsing the implications of 
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In January 2018, a report titled Uber State Interface: How Transportation Network 
Companies Buy, Bully, and Bamboozle Their Way to Deregulation was released, 
which used four years of data and case study analysis to develop a framework of 
state interference by transportation network companies (TNCs), such as Uber, Lyft, 
and DoorDash. In the report, state interference is defined as “the strategy of 
circumventing local democracy by passing state-level laws that prevent cities from 
governing on specific issues” and is analogous to legal preemption.1 Typically, 
according to this framework, TNCs will enter a local market and ignore existing 
transportation regulation regimes – provoking a reaction by entrenched industry 
and political interests, such as taxi companies and government regulators. In 
response to this pushback – which often takes the form of municipal-level 
regulatory attempts – the TNCs will initially attempt to spend their way to state 
preemption of these local efforts by leveraging their significant resources into 
political capital through expensive lobbyists, advertisements, and political 
donations. Should these more traditional legislative efforts fail, they will then 
attempt to “bully and bamboozle” their way to important regulatory concessions 
via threats and misinformation campaigns that have proven effective at mobilizing 
the rideshare consumer base against regulation and neutralizing anti-TNC political 
action at the local level.2 
Perhaps the most-prized concession sought by TNCs is their ability to 
classify their drivers as independent contractors as opposed to employees, which 
generally requires state interference “given that the employment relationship is 
typically determined by a combination of state and federal laws.”3 This 
classification is vital to the TNC business model – a topic to which we will return 
– and a number of states, particularly those with ideologically conservative 
leadership which have passed legislation facilitating the codification of this TNC-
friendly classification regime. Often these statutes were written to preempt existing 
local classification regulations, such as in Texas and Pennsylvania. However, a 
number were sponsored or even written by TNCs to preempt an otherwise empty 
policy field.4 
 
1 Joy Borkholder et al., Uber State Interference: How TNC’s Buy, Bully, and Bamboozle Their 
Way to Deregulation (National Employment Law Project and Partnership for Working 
Families, 2018), 10, https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Uber-State-Interference-
How-Transportation-Network-Companies-Buy-Bully-Bamboozle-Their-Way-to-
Deregulation.pdf. 
2 Borkholder et al, 15. 
3 Borkholder et al, 13. 
4 Borkholder et al, 20. 
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Within this framework, the passage of the TNC-sponsored Proposition 22 
in California via that state’s ballot initiative process can be viewed as something of 
a new phenomenon. Taking advantage of democratic processes is not new for the 
TNCs, but Proposition 22 preempts an existing state law – California Assembly 
Bill No. 5 (AB 5), passed via the legislature in part to force TNCs to classify their 
drivers as employees – whereas the state interference framework outlined by the 
Borkholder et al. report was used to explain state interference of local regulation. 
However, while this particular aspect of the process was certainly novel, 
Proposition 22 is best understood as an escalation of the typical TNC strategy of 
state interference, where an existential threat to the TNC business model prompted 
further innovation within the existing framework. 
This paper will begin with a brief outline of the relevant case and legislative 
history which led the TNCs to pursue Proposition 22 in California. From there, it 
will discuss what Proposition 22 does and, by extension, why it is so crucial for the 
TNC business model. It will then turn its attention to the pro-Proposition 22 
campaign and how it used in-app “clicktivism,” political contributions, 
misinformation, and superficial racial politics to mobilize the California electorate. 
The paper will close with a section dedicated to parsing the implications of 
Proposition 22’s passage, including what it portends for the future of labor relations 
in this country. 
 
A BRIEF HISTORY 
For rideshare drivers, one of the primary appeals – at least initially – of working for 
a TNC is the flexible scheduling which gives them some degree of control over 
when and where they will work. However, TNC executives have argued since the 
industry’s inception that this aspect of employment is contingent upon the driver’s 
classification as an independent contractor rather than employee. In the United 
States this was generally considered an acceptable tradeoff for the majority of 
drivers until wages began to drop below the minimum wage, which began to occur 
in California around 2017.5 Compounding this dynamic was the growing sense that 
precarity is the Janus-faced twin of flexibility: 
Drivers complain of fare cuts, lack of transparency in pay 
calculation, high expenses associated with driving, fear of 
termination associated with Uber’s rating system, and lack of 
 
5 Mark Erlich, “Construction Workers and the Gig Economy,” Dissent, 2020 Spring Edition, 
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/construction-workers-and-the-gig-economy. 
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training and driver support – many of which could be addressed 
through existing labor and employment laws.6 
 
As the end of this passage suggests, drivers in California and elsewhere 
began to link this precarity with their employer-imposed classification as 
independent contractors. 
When the California Supreme Court released its decision in the 2018 
Dynamex Operations v. Superior Court case, a ruling that raised the standards of 
independent contractor classification in favor of employees via the rigorous ABC 
test, it set the stage for a political showdown between drivers and their TNC 
bosses.7 The Dynamex ruling, one of the more famous rulings in a massive case file 
of similar litigation, provided the legal foundation for a piece of legislation known 
as AB 5 that was signed into law on September 18th, 2019 by California Governor 
Gavin Newsom. AB 5 was a huge victory for labor advocates because it codified 
the Dynamex ruling’s ABC test into California state law as the default 
determination of the employer-employee relationship, meaning that rideshare 
drivers would have to meet the following criteria to be classified as independent 
contractors: 
A. The person is free from the control and direction of the hiring 
entity in connection with the performance of the work, both 
under the contract for the performance of the work and in 
fact. 
B. The person performs work that is outside the usual course of 
the hiring entity’s business. 
C. The person is customarily engaged in an independently 
established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature 
as that involved in the work performed.8 
 
This mandated re-classification had the potential to open the door for drivers 
to receive the sorts of labor protections and benefits, such as a guaranteed minimum 
 
6 V.B. Dubal, Ruth Berlins Collier, and Christopher Carter, “Disrupting Regulation, Regulating 
Disruption: The Politics of Uber in the United States,” University of California Hastings 
College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series (2018): 17, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3147296. 
7 Andrew Hawkins, “Uber and Lyft drivers could get employment status under California court 
ruling,” The Verge, May 1st, 2020, https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/1/17308178/uber-lyft-
drivers-california-court-classification-dynamex. 
8 Assembly Bill No. 5, California Legislative Assembly, 2019 Regular Session, 4, 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB5. 
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wage and right to unionize, that are not afforded to independent contractors under 
current labor law.9 
The TNCs responded to the passage of AB 5 by ignoring the new 
classification requirements entirely. Uber released a statement declaring that the 
new standards did not change its classification calculation, and cited statistics 
showing that the majority of its drivers support their status as independent 
contractors.10 There is reason to be skeptical of these figures, however, as the New 
York Times have reported on past efforts by the company to manipulate survey 
data in its favor.11 Regardless, in the same AB 5 press statement, Uber announced 
its intention to begin work with other TNCs to craft the ballot measure campaign 
that would become Proposition 22. 
However, while the TNCs continued to hold the line on the classification 
issue in defiance of AB 5, they were met with resistance from a variety of sources. 
David Weil, a former member of the Obama Administration’s Department of 
Labor, penned a 2019 Los Angeles Times op-ed condemning the TNCs for their 
systematic misclassification of its drivers.12 In 2020, an official California state 
order declared that TNC drivers do not meet the criteria established under AB 5 for 
independent contractor status.13 Meanwhile, a pair of lawsuits were brought against 
Uber and Lyft on behalf of rideshare drivers in order to stop their continued 
misclassification under AB 5 and to recover unpaid wages lost due to this 
misclassification.14 And in a separate legal case, the San Francisco Superior Court 
also found the TNCs to be in violation of AB 5 classification requirements, a ruling 
 
9 Dubal et al, Disrupting Regulation, 7. 
10 Tony West, “Update on AB5,” Uber Newsroom, September 12, 2020, 
https://www.uber.com/newsroom/ab5-update. 
11 Mike Isaac, “Uber’s C.E.O. Plays with Fire,” New York Times, April 23, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/23/technology/travis-kalanick-pushes-uber-and-himself-
to-the-precipice.html. 
12 David Weil, “Op-Ed: Call Uber and Lyft drivers what they are: employees,” Los Angeles Times, 
July 05, 2020, https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-weil-uber-lyft-employees-
contractors-20190705-story.html. 
13 California Public Utilities Commission, “Order Instituting Rulemaking on Regulations Relating 
to Passenger Carriers, Ridesharing, and New Online-Enable Transportation Services,” 
COM/GSH/kzl, San Francisco, CA: CPUC, June 9th, 2020, 5. 
14 California Labor Commissioner’s Office, “Labor Commissioner’s Office Files Lawsuits against 
Uber and Lyft for Engaging in Systemic Wage Theft,” CDIR 2020-65, 5 August 2020, 
https://www.dir.ca.gov/DIRNews/2020/2020-65.html. 
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which prompted both Uber and Lyft to threaten to suspend California operations if 
the ruling wasn’t overturned on appeal.15 
As mentioned in the introduction, this is largely familiar ground for the 
TNCs, who are well-versed in using threats and ballot initiatives to skirt 
regulation.16 However, what is novel about this particular case is how the level of 
needed preemption had changed for the TNCs: while their previous efforts had 
focused on preempting local regulation via state interference, in this circumstance, 
the TNCs needed to preempt a state regulatory framework. That the TNCs pumped 
roughly $200 million into the Proposition 22 campaign, outspending their 
opponents nearly 10 to 1, demonstrates the significant savings these companies 
expected to accrue via this preemption.17 In the next section we will take a step 
backwards and explain what it is about this classification question that is so crucial 
to the TNC business model and how Proposition 22 answers it, at least in California. 
 
WHAT PROPOSITION 22 DOES 
The core goal of the Proposition 22 campaign was to exempt app-based drivers 
from the AB 5 classification regime, and return the sector to a less-stringent 
regulatory system that would allow the TNCs to continue categorizing their drivers 
as independent contractors.18 Proponents of Proposition 22 spun the regulatory roll-
back as a potential victory for those drivers who prioritized flexibility, and pointed 
to a number of additional benefits they would receive under the ballot measure, 
including an earnings guarantee and health care contributions.19 However, the 
majority of these benefits are tied to a driver’s “engaged time,” which does not 
include a number of work-related actions such as “pumping gas, waiting for a ride 
request to pop up on their phones, or wiping vomit from the backseat after dropping 
off a drunk passenger who didn’t tip.”20 For example, the earnings guarantee, which 
ostensibly sets a floor for driver compensation at 120% of the California minimum 
wage, would work out to an estimated $15.60 in 2021. However, a UC Berkeley 
Labor study found that after accounting for the full cost of associated expenses and 
 
15 Clare Roth, “Uber Seeks Court Reprieve After California Shutdown Threat,” Bloomberg News, 
August 17th, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-17/uber-seeks-court-
reprieve-after-california-shutdown-threat. 
16 Dubal et al, Disrupting Regulation, 12. 
17 Michelle Chen, “A Blow for Labor Rights in California,” Dissent, November 9th, 2020, 
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/a-blow-for-labor-rights-in-california. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Yes on 22. 2020. “Key Facts About Proposition 22.” Yes on 22, 2020. Retrieved on November 
15, 2020 from https://yeson22.com/get-the-facts/. 
20 Chen, “A Blow for Labor Rights in California.” 
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waiting time, the actual take home pay for drivers would be equivalent to $5.64 an 
hour, far below both the California and federal minimum wage.21 The other 
ancillary benefits included in Proposition 22 are similarly inferior to the protections 
granted by standard state and federal labor laws provided to employees but, 
crucially, not to independent contractors.  
And this is the crux of the matter: TNCs push schedule flexibility 
supposedly to empower workers, but the savings they reap from this dubious 
classification are so massive that they comprise a major foundation of their overall 
business model. To get a sense of these savings, an article in The American 
Prospect from October 2020 reported that Uber and Lyft’s misclassification of its 
drivers produced a windfall of $413 million in unpaid unemployment insurance 
payments alone since 2014.22 And an article in the Spring 2020 edition of Dissent 
estimated that TNCs save up 30 percent in labor costs by depriving their drivers of 
“a century of hard-won workers’ rights” such as entitlement to overtime 
compensation, minimum wage protections, and the right to form a union, among 
others.23 These companies do not turn a profit, so this misclassification is one of 
the only things, alongside large venture capital subsidies, keeping them afloat while 
they wait (and wait) for driverless technology to remove drivers and their associated 
costs from the equation altogether.24 When viewed from this perspective, it is 
perfectly understandable that the TNCs would view AB 5 as an existential threat, 
because its crackdown on employment relationship misclassification 
fundamentally destabilizes a key pillar of their business model. 
Before moving on, it is worthwhile to consider the implications of this 
business model from the perspective of the California State government, its 
taxpayers, and the TNC drivers themselves. As outlined in a 2020 study co-
produced by the UCLA Labor Center and SEIU-United Healthcare Workers West, 
the vast majority of the savings which the TNCs accumulate from their preferred 
classification practices is money that would otherwise be going into state worker 
protection funds, such as the aforementioned unemployment insurance and workers 
compensation programs. The problem is that without that money flowing from the 
 
21 Ken Jacobs and Michael Reich, “The Effects of Proposition 22 on Driver Earnings: Response to 
a Lyft-Funded Report by Dr. Christopher Thornberg,” University of California Berkeley 
Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, October 31, 2019, 1, 
https://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Response-to-Thornberg.pdf. 
22 Alexander Sammon, “How Uber and Lyft Are Buying Labor Laws,” The American Prospect, 
October 5th, 2020, https://prospect.org/labor/how-uber-and-lyft-are-buying-labor-laws/. 
23 Erlich, “Construction Workers and Gig Economy.” 
24 Alex Press, “With Prop 22’s Passage in California, Tech Companies Are Just Writing Their 
Own Laws Now,” Jacobin, November 6th, 2020, https://jacobinmag.com/2020/11/proposition-
22-california-uber-lyft-gig-employee. 
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TNCs into these programs – and other avenues such as the payroll tax, which the 
TNCs are also able to dodge via misclassification – the burden for supporting 
injured or out of work drivers falls onto the California taxpayer.25 Even in the best 
of times this is an onerous arrangement for Californians, but the COVID-19 
pandemic has highlighted how inequitable it truly is as the baseline precarity of 
rideshare driving has been compounded by virus-related unsafe working 
conditions, an economic recession that has seriously curtailed moneymaking 
opportunity, and largely unresponsive employers.26 The result has been a workforce 
with little recourse but to either suffer alone or turn to the government – and by 
extension its taxpayers – for help. 
Of course this is the same period during which the TNCs were spending 
millions to preserve their preferred classification status, and when viewed from this 
perspective, it is rather surprising that Proposition 22 was able to emerge from the 
November 2020 election having passed, especially considering that many of 
California’s most famous ballot measures – such as Proposition 13 – have 
concerned themselves with decreasing the tax burden on state citizens.27 
Proposition 22’s victory in this context speaks to the sheer scale and scope of the 
effort undertaken by the TNCs. In the next section, we will discuss how they 
leveraged their resources to achieve victory. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN 
A common-place TNC strategy in regulatory battles is to attempt to turn customers 
into political advocates. This is an incredibly innovative tactic that is generally not 
typical of a for-profit company, and it has proven very useful in the TNCs quest to 
maintain a lucrative business environment. However, while these companies tend 
to paint this mobilization as a standard quid pro quo arrangement, where the TNCs 
trade a superior product for political support, it obscures the work being done to 
mystify the relationship between regulation and the companies’ core business 
model.28 This mystification is a necessary part of the broader framework posited by 
Borkholder et al which the TNCs employ to “buy, bully and bamboozle” their way 
to favorable regulatory regimes. In this section, we will discuss how these 
 
25 Lucero Herrera, Brian Justie, Tia Koonse, and Saba Waheed, Worker Ownership, COVID-19, 
and the Future of the Gig Economy (Los Angeles: UCLA: Institute for Research on Labor 
and Employment, 2020), accessed November 23, 2020, 7, 
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3h60d754. 
26 Herrera, 15. 
27 Peter Schrag, Paradise Lost: California’s Experience, America’s Future (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1998), 7-23. 
28 Borkholder et al, Uber State Interference, 22-23. 
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companies leveraged their vast resources – built largely on employment 
misclassification and venture capital subsidization – to dupe the California 
electorate into passing the regressive Proposition 22. 
We have mentioned in a previous section that pro-Proposition 22 spending 
totaled roughly $200 million, ten times more than their opposition, which was made 
up of a coalition of TNC driver organizations, labor unions, and their grassroots 
and political allies. A large portion of this huge sum went to advertisement buys 
which bombarded California residents with a relentless onslaught of pro-initiative 
propaganda. According to Michelle Chen, writing in Dissent, “spending on 
Facebook ads alone topped what either major-party presidential campaign had 
spent in state.”29 In addition, some of these advertisements were purposefully 
misleading, such as the faux-progressive mailer sent to Bay Area residents that was 
designed to appear as if it had come from a non-existent group associated with 
Senator Bernie Sanders.30 
The TNCs also put their technology to work, flooding app interfaces with a 
torrent of misleading messaging that simultaneously framed Proposition 22 as a 
pro-driver initiative and the only thing standing between the industry and 
annihilation at the hands of anti-tech politicians and regulators.31 This type of 
“clicktivism” is a well-worn tactic for TNCs, pairing with their more aggressive 
posturing and threats to shape the narrative around regulation.32 In this sense, the 
“bully and bamboozle” elements of Borkholder et al’s framework operate hand in 
glove to produce the necessary dissonance to facilitate the consumer political 
mobilization discussed in the opening paragraph of this section. A clear example of 
this manufactured dissonance can be found in the initiative’s working title – the 
Protect App-Based Drivers and Service Act – which cast Proposition 22 as the 
means to deliver rideshare drivers exactly the sort of protection it was designed to 
prevent.33 
Finally, it is important to point out the use of racialized arguments by pro- 
Proposition 22 groups to garner support for the initiative. In the midst of a summer 
defined by racial justice protests stemming from the murder of George Floyd, 
 
29 Chen, “A Blow for Labor Rights in California.” 
30 Mike Moffitt, “Fake progressive mailers urge yes on Uber/Lyft’s Prop. 22,” SFGATE, October 
9th, 2020, https://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Fake-progressive-mailers-urge-yes-on-Uber-
Lyft-15635173.php. 
31 Chen, “A Blow for Labor Rights in California.” 
32 Borkholder et al, Uber State Interference, 11. 
33 Megan Rose Dickey, “This is the gig worker ballot initiative Uber, Lyft, Doordash and Instacart 
are backing,” Tech Crunch, October 29, 2019, https://techcrunch.com/2019/10/29/this-is-the-
gig-worker-ballot-initiative-uber-lyft-and-doordash-are-backing/. 
Midgley: Transportation Network Companies, Proposition 22, and the Future of Labor Relations in the United States







Breonna Taylor, and others at the hands of the police, organizations such as the 
NAACP California, Black Lives Matter Sacramento, Hispanic 100, and the Si Se 
Puede Foundation provided important endorsements for the initiative.34 However, 
it was later revealed that an $85,000 payment had been made to the President of the 
California NAACP’s private consulting firm on behalf of the TNCs, which some 
critics framed as a quid pro quo exchange for the organization’s endorsement.35 
This revelation was part of a larger discourse in which drivers had criticized the 
TNCs for their cynical deployment of Black Lives Matter (BLM) messaging.36 For 
example, Rideshare Drivers United, a rideshare driver association, published a No 
on Proposition 22 factsheet which cited statistics claiming that 70% of rideshare 
drivers in this country are people of color, and underscored the hypocrisy of the 
TNCs use of BLM talking points in their advertisements and the Proposition 22 
political campaign while at the same time pushing policies that “deny their 
workforce the wages, benefits, and protections they deserve.”37  
In his book Toward Freedom: The Case Against Race Reductionism, 
historian Touré Reed argues that a revitalized labor union movement in the United 
States is a crucial piece of any program seriously aimed at addressing the material 
racial disparities in this country, due in part to the higher wages and benefits 
provided to union members and to the overrepresentation of people of color in 
membership rolls.38 Policies such as Proposition 22 lock rideshare drivers – 
disproportionately people of color – into independent contractor status, preventing 
them from the legal means to collectively organize and blocking one of the most 
effective tools for racial and economic justice. Additionally, they also prevent 
drivers from protection under important anti-discrimination protections.39 As we 
will discuss in the final section, this is just the tip of the iceberg of a larger assault 
on labor protections that Proposition 22 may help to accelerate. 
 
 
34 Matthew Rozsa, “Rideshare drivers say Uber is co-opting anti-racist rhetoric,” Salon, September 
10th, 2020, https://www.salon.com/2020/09/10/uber-drivers-protest-oakland-black-lives-
matter-co-optation/. 
35 Katie Canales, “Prop 22 has courted the endorsement of California’s NAACP president – and 
Uber and Lyft have paid her consulting firm $85,000 to boost the controversial measure,” 
Business Insider, October 21st, 2020 https://www.businessinsider.com/uber-lyft-paid-naacp-
alice-huffman-prop-22-2020-10. 
36 Rozsa, “Rideshare drivers say Uber is co-opting anti-racist rhetoric.” 
37 Rideshare Drivers United, “No on Uber’s Prop 22: Stop Exempting Uber & Lyft from Basic 
Labor Laws!” Rideshare Drivers United, retrieved November 22nd, 2020, https://drivers-
united.org/p/prop22. 
38 Touré Reed, Toward Freedom: The Case Against Race Reductionism (New York: Verso, 2020), 
168-169. 
39 Erlich, “Construction Workers and Gig Economy.” 
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Unfortunately for opponents of Proposition 22, a provision written into the 
initiative requires that it can only be overturned by a seven-eighths majority in the 
state legislature, making it a nearly impossible task.40 Proposition 22 is here to stay, 
and shortly after their victory TNC executives declared their intent to spread the 
model elsewhere, whether via state ballot measure, federal statue, or other means. 
Despite this optimism, there remain reasons to be skeptical about the long-term 
prospects of the TNCs, despite their victory in California. Court cases, government 
action, and worker demonstrations across the globe are seriously threatening the 
TNCs’ employment classification preference, and the technology needed to replace 
drivers doesn’t appear close to completion.41 Furthermore, the TNCs’ desire to 
export Proposition 22 won’t be easy, as the initiative’s win has further galvanized 
this already sizable grassroots opposition across the country and globe.42 However, 
it is impossible to look at Proposition 22’s victory as anything but a major victory 
for the TNCs and a setback for rideshare drivers in California and elsewhere, as 
well as their allies in the labor movement. 
In addition, there are also potentially significant negative implications for 
workforces outside of the rideshare industry, including for blue-collar workers, 
public sector employees, and white-collar professionals. As Erlich point outs in 
Dissent, AB 5 is likely to “have just as large an impact on more traditional 
industries, such as construction, trucking, hospitality, and janitorial services,” 
which also rely on misclassifying workers in order to keep labor costs low.43 
Policies such as Proposition 22 may incentivize these industries to seek similar 
carveouts. The initiative’s victory could also further incentivize the privatization of 
government service, as budgetary crises spur local and state government to look to 
save money by offloading burdensome public sector union contracts. For example, 
a cash-strapped jurisdiction legally obligated to balance its budget and dealing with 
reduced revenues and increased expenditures thanks to the COVID-19 crisis may 
find a significant savings on labor costs extremely attractive and elect to contract 
out its service provision via independent contractors. If this seems unlikely, 
consider that a large portion of the white-collar professionals that Google employs 
are classified as independent contractors, and it becomes apparent that this 
 
40 Chen, “A Blow for Labor Rights in California.” 
41 Press, “With Prop 22’s Passage in California.” 
42 Chen, “A Blow for Labor Rights in California.” 
43 Erlich, “Construction Workers and Gig Economy.” 
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particular innovation may be, as Press writes in Jacobin, “the future of work for us 
all if Silicon Valley has anything to say about it.”44  
The TNCs’ campaign to overturn AB 5 – built on an escalation of their 
typical “barge into, buy, bully, and bamboozle” strategy of state interference – and 
their utilization of a business model predicated on labor arbitrage has provided a 
ready-made playbook for other powerful business and corporate interests to draw 
from. To this end – and in only a few short months since the initiative’s passing – 
the California economy is already feeling exactly these sorts of knock-on effects. 
In January of 2021, Albertsons, the second largest grocery chain in the country, laid 
off its entire staff of unionized delivery drivers in California and replaced them with 
independent contractors.45 From this perspective, Proposition 22 represents a 
significant step towards an economy-wide circumvention of the labor rights and 






Assembly Bill No. 5. California Legislative Assembly, 2019 Regular Session. 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=20192020
0AB5. 
Borkholder, Joy, Mariah Montgomery, Miya Saika Chen, and Rebecca Smith. 
Uber State Interference: How TNC’s Buy, Bully, and Bamboozle Their Way to 
Deregulation. National Employment Law Project and Partnership for 
Working Families, 2018. https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Uber-
State-Interference-How-Transportation-Network-Companies-Buy-Bully-
Bamboozle-Their-Way-to-Deregulation.pdf. 
California Public Utilities Commission. “Order Instituting Rulemaking on 
Regulations Relating to Passenger Carriers, Ridesharing, and New Online-
Enable Transportation Services.” COM/GSH/kzl, San Francisco, CA: CPUC, 
June 9th, 2020. 
 
44 Press, “With Prop 22’s Passage in California.” 
45 Kenny Stancil, “‘Devastating Effects’ of CA Prop 22 Begin as Albertsons Stores Move to 
Replace Unionized Drivers With Gig Workers,” Common Dreams, January 05, 2021, 
https://www.commondreams.org/news/2021/01/05/devastating-effects-ca-prop-22-begin-
albertsons-stores-move-replace-unionized. 
Hatfield Graduate Journal of Public Affairs, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 6







California Labor Commissioner’s Office. “Labor Commissioner’s Office Files 
Lawsuits against Uber and Lyft for Engaging in Systemic Wage Theft,” CDIR 
2020-65, 5 August 2020. https://www.dir.ca.gov/DIRNews/2020/2020-
65.html. 
Canales, Katie “Prop 22 has courted the endorsement of California’s NAACP 
president – and Uber and Lyft have paid her consulting firm $85,000 to boost 
the controversial measure.” Business Insider, October 21st, 2020. 
https://www.businessinsider.com/uber-lyft-paid-naacp-alice-huffman-prop-
22-2020-10. 
Chen, Michelle. “A Blow for Labor Rights in California.” Dissent, November 9th, 
2020. https://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/a-blow-for-labor-rights-in-
california. 
Dickey, Megan Rose. “This is the gig worker ballot initiative Uber, Lyft, 
Doordash and Instacart are backing.” Tech Crunch, October 29, 2019. 
https://techcrunch.com/2019/10/29/this-is-the-gig-worker-ballot-initiative-
uber-lyft-and-doordash-are-backing/. 
Dubal, V.B., Ruth Berlins Collier, and Christopher Carter. “Disrupting 
Regulation, Regulating Disruption: The Politics of Uber in the United States.” 
University of California Hastings College of Law Legal Studies Research 
Paper Series (2018): 17. 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3147296. 
Erlich, Mark. “Construction Workers and the Gig Economy.” Dissent, 2020 
Spring Edition. https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/construction-
workers-and-the-gig-economy. 
Hawkins, Andrew. “Uber and Lyft drivers could get employment status under 
California court ruling.” The Verge, May 1st, 2020. 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/1/17308178/uber-lyft-drivers-california-
court-classification-dynamex. 
Herrera, Lucero, Brian Justie, Tia Koonse, and Saba Waheed. Worker Ownership, 
COVID-19, and the Future of the Gig Economy. Los Angeles: UCLA: 
Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, 2020. 
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3h60d754. 
Midgley: Transportation Network Companies, Proposition 22, and the Future of Labor Relations in the United States







Isaac, Mike. “Uber’s C.E.O. Plays with Fire.” New York Times, April 23, 2017. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/23/technology/travis-kalanick-pushes-
uber-and-himself-to-the-precipice.html. 
Jacobs, Ken and Michael Reich. “The Effects of Proposition 22 on Driver 
Earnings: Response to a Lyft-Funded Report by Dr. Christopher Thornberg.” 
University of California Berkeley Institute for Research on Labor and 
Employment, October 31, 2019. https://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/08/Response-to-Thornberg.pdf. 
Moffitt, Mike. “Fake progressive mailers urge yes on Uber/Lyft’s Prop. 22.” 
SFGATE, October 9th, 2020, https://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Fake-
progressive-mailers-urge-yes-on-Uber-Lyft-15635173.php. 
Press, Alex. “With Prop 22’s Passage in California, Tech Companies Are Just 
Writing Their Own Laws Now.” Jacobin, November 6th, 2020. 
https://jacobinmag.com/2020/11/proposition-22-california-uber-lyft-gig-
employee. 
Rideshare Drivers United. “No on Uber’s Prop 22: Stop Exempting Uber & Lyft 
from Basic Labor Laws!” Rideshare Drivers United, retrieved November 22nd, 
2020, from https://drivers-united.org/p/prop22. 
Reed, Touré. Toward Freedom: The Case Against Race Reductionism. New York: 
Verso, 2020. 
Roth, Clare. “Uber Seeks Court Reprieve After California Shutdown Threat.” 
Bloomberg News, August 17th, 2020. 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-17/uber-seeks-court-
reprieve-after-california-shutdown-threat. 
Rozsa, Matthew. “Rideshare drivers say Uber is co-opting anti-racist rhetoric.” 
Salon, September 10th, 2020. https://www.salon.com/2020/09/10/uber-drivers-
protest-oakland-black-lives-matter-co-optation/. 
Sammon, Alexander. “How Uber and Lyft Are Buying Labor Laws.” The 
American Prospect, October 5th, 2020. https://prospect.org/labor/how-uber-
and-lyft-are-buying-labor-laws/. 
Schrag, Peter. Paradise Lost: California’s Experience, America’s Future. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998: 7-23. 
Hatfield Graduate Journal of Public Affairs, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 6







Stancil, Kenny. “‘Devastating Effects’ of CA Prop 22 Begin as Albertsons Stores 
Move to Replace Unionized Drivers With Gig Workers,” Common Dreams, 
January 05, 2021. 
https://www.commondreams.org/news/2021/01/05/devastating-effects-ca-
prop-22-begin-albertsons-stores-move-replace-unionized. 
Weil, David.  “Op-Ed: Call Uber and Lyft drivers what they are: employees,” Los 
Angeles Times, July 05, 2020. https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-
weil-uber-lyft-employees-contractors-20190705-story.html. 
West, Tony. “Update on AB5.” Uber Newsroom, September 12, 2020. 
https://www.uber.com/newsroom/ab5-update. 
Yes on 22. 2020. “Key Facts About Proposition 22.” Yes on 22, 2020. Retrieved 
on November 15, 2020 from https://yeson22.com/get-the-facts/. 
 
 
Midgley: Transportation Network Companies, Proposition 22, and the Future of Labor Relations in the United States
